Japanese-american Internment

Constructs such as ibid., loc. And idem are discouraged for footnotes, as they are easily broken. Please by replacing them with named references, or an abbreviated title. (July 2013) Japanese American internment Date 1942 - 1946 Location Japanese American internment was the in 'War Relocation Camps' of over 110,000 people of Japanese heritage who lived on the Pacific coast of the. Government ordered the internment in 1942, shortly after 's. The internment of Japanese Americans was applied unequally as a geographic matter: all who lived on the West Coast were interned, while in Hawaii, where 150,000-plus Japanese Americans comprised over one-third of the population, only 1,200 to 1,800 were interned.

Sixty-two percent of the internees were American citizens. President authorized the internment with, issued February 19, 1942, which allowed local military commanders to designate 'military areas' as 'exclusion zones,' from which 'any or all persons may be excluded.'

This power was used to declare that all people of Japanese ancestry were excluded from the entire Pacific coast, including all of California and much of Oregon, Washington and Arizona, except for those in internment camps. In 1944, the Supreme Court the constitutionality of the exclusion orders. The Court limited its decision to the validity of the exclusion orders, adding, 'The provisions of other orders requiring persons of Japanese ancestry to report to assembly centers and providing for the detention of such persons in assembly and relocation centers were separate, and their validity is not in issue in this proceeding.' The United States Census Bureau assisted the internment efforts by providing confidential neighborhood information on Japanese Americans. The Bureau's role was denied for decades, but was finally proven in 2007. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter conducted an investigation to determine whether putting Japanese Americans into internment camps was justified well enough by the government. He appointed the (CWRIC) to investigate the camps.

The commission's report, named “Personal Justice Denied,” found little evidence of Japanese disloyalty at the time and recommended the government pay reparations to the survivors. They formed a payment of $20,000 to each individual internment camp survivor.

In 1988, Congress passed and signed legislation that apologized for the internment on behalf of the U.S. The legislation said that government actions were based on 'race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership'. Government eventually disbursed more than $1.6 billion in reparations to Japanese Americans who had been interned and their heirs. Of 127,000 Japanese Americans living in the continental United States at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, 112,000 resided on the West Coast. About 80,000 were nisei (literal translation: 'second generation'; Japanese people born in the United States and holding American citizenship) and (literal translation: 'third generation'; the sons or daughters of nisei). The rest were (literal translation: 'first generation'; immigrants born in Japan who were ineligible for U.S. Contents After Pearl Harbor San Francisco Examiner, February 1942.

A Japanese American unfurled this banner the day after the Pearl Harbor attack. This photograph was taken in March 1942, just prior to the man's internment.

Children at the Weill public school in San Francisco to the American flag in April 1942, prior to the internment of Japanese Americans. Taken by, this photograph is labeled 'Tagged for evacuation, Salinas, California, May 1942'. The on December 7, 1941 led military and political leaders to suspect that was preparing a full-scale attack on the West Coast of the United States. Japan's of a large portion of Asia and the Pacific between 1936 and 1942 made its military forces seem unstoppable to some Americans. American public opinion initially stood by the large population of Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast, with the Los Angeles Times characterizing them as 'good Americans, born and educated as such.'

Many Americans believed that their loyalty to the United States was unquestionable. However, six weeks after the attack, public opinion turned against Japanese Americans living in on the West Coast, as the press and other Americans became nervous about the potential for activity. Though the administration (including the President and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover) dismissed all rumors of Japanese-American espionage on behalf of the Japanese War effort, pressure mounted upon the Administration as the tide of public opinion turned against Japanese-Americans.

Civilian and military officials had serious concerns about the loyalty of the ethnic Japanese after the which immediately followed the attack on Pearl Harbor, when a civilian Japanese national and two Hawaiian-born ethnic Japanese on the island of Ni'ihau violently freed a downed and captured Japanese naval airman, attacking their fellow Ni'ihau islanders in the process. Several concerns over the loyalty of ethnic Japanese seemed to stem from rather than evidence of actual malfeasance. Major and Lieutenant General, head of the Western Command, each questioned Japanese American loyalty.

DeWitt, who administered the internment program, repeatedly told newspapers that 'A Jap's a Jap' and testified to Congress, I don't want any of them persons of Japanese ancestry here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese.

American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty. But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map. DeWitt also sought approval to conduct search and seizure operations aimed at preventing alien Japanese from making radio transmissions to Japanese ships.

Japanese-american Internment Ww2

The Justice Department declined, stating that there was no probable cause to support DeWitt's assertion, as the FBI concluded that there was no security threat. On January 2, the Joint Immigration Committee of the California Legislature sent a manifesto to California newspapers which attacked 'the ethnic Japanese,' who it alleged were 'totally unassimilable.' This manifesto further argued that all people of Japanese heritage were loyal subjects of the; Japanese language schools, furthermore, according to the manifesto, were bastions of racism which advanced doctrines of Japanese racial superiority. The manifesto was backed by the and the California Department of the, which in January demanded that all Japanese with dual citizenship be placed in concentration camps.

Internment was not limited to those who had been to Japan, but included a small number of German and Italian enemy aliens. By February, the Attorney General of California, had begun his efforts to persuade the federal government to remove all people of Japanese heritage from the West Coast. Those that were as little as 1/16 Japanese could be placed in internment camps.

There is evidence supporting the argument that the measures were racially motivated, rather than a military necessity. For example, orphaned infants with 'one drop of Japanese blood' (as explained in a letter by one official) were included in the program. Upon the bombing of Pearl Harbor and pursuant to the, Presidential Proclamations 2525, 2526 and 2527 were issued designating Japanese, German and Italian nationals as enemy aliens. Information from the CDI was used to locate and incarcerate foreign nationals from Japan, Germany and Italy (although Germany and Italy did not declare war on the U.S. Until December 11). Presidential Proclamation 2537 was issued on January 14, 1942, requiring aliens to report any change of address, employment or name to the FBI.

Enemy aliens were not allowed to enter restricted areas. Violators of these regulations were subject to 'arrest, detention and internment for the duration of the war.' Executive Order 9066 and related actions Executive Order 9066, signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942, allowed authorized military commanders to designate 'military areas' at their discretion, 'from which any or all persons may be excluded.' These 'exclusion zones,' unlike the 'alien enemy' roundups, were applicable to anyone that an authorized military commander might choose, whether citizen or non-citizen. Eventually such zones would include parts of both the East and West Coasts, totaling about 1/3 of the country by area. Unlike the subsequent detainment and internment programs that would come to be applied to large numbers of Japanese Americans, detentions and restrictions directly under this Individual Exclusion Program were placed primarily on individuals of German or Italian ancestry, including American citizens.

March 2, 1942: Lieutenant General issued Public Proclamation No. 1, declaring that 'such person or classes of persons as the situation may require' would, at some later point, be subject to exclusion orders from 'Military Area No.

1' (essentially, the entire Pacific coast to about 100 miles (160.9 km) inland), and requiring anyone who had 'enemy' ancestry to file a Change of Residence Notice if they planned to move. A second exclusion zone was designated several months later, which included the areas chosen by most of the Japanese Americans who had managed to leave the first zone.

March 11, 1942: Executive Order 9095 created the Office of the Alien Property Custodian, and gave it discretionary, plenary authority over all alien property interests. Many assets were frozen, creating immediate financial difficulty for the affected aliens, preventing most from moving out of the exclusion zones. March 24, 1942: Public Proclamation No. 3 declares an 8:00 pm to 6:00 am curfew for 'all enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry' within the military areas. March 24, 1942: General DeWitt began to issue Civilian Exclusion Orders for specific areas within 'Military Area No. Japanese Americans on, Washington were the first in the country to be subject to such an order, due to the island's proximity to naval bases; they were given until March 30 to prepare themselves for removal from the island, an event commemorated by the.

March 27, 1942: General DeWitt's Proclamation No. 4 prohibited all those of Japanese ancestry from leaving 'Military Area No. 1' for 'any purpose until and to the extent that a future proclamation or order of this headquarters shall so permit or direct.' . May 3, 1942: General DeWitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order No.

34, ordering all people of Japanese ancestry, whether citizens or non-citizens, who were still living in 'Military Area No. 1' to report to assembly centers, where they would live until being moved to permanent 'Relocation Centers.' These edicts included persons of part-Japanese ancestry as well. Anyone with at least one-sixteenth (equivalent to having one great-great grandparent) Japanese ancestry was eligible. Korean-Americans and Taiwaneseconsidered to have Japanese nationality (since Korea and Taiwan were both Japanese colonies), were also included. Non-military advocates for exclusion, removal, and detention Internment was popular among many white farmers who resented the Japanese American farmers. 'White American farmers admitted that their self-interest required removal of the Japanese.'

These individuals saw internment as a convenient means of uprooting their Japanese American competitors. Anson, managing secretary of the Salinas Vegetable Grower-Shipper Association, told the Saturday Evening Post in 1942: 'We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. It's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men. They came into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over.

If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we do not want them back when the war ends, either.' The Roberts Commission Report, prepared at President Franklin D. Roosevelt's request, has been cited as an example of the fear and prejudice informing the thinking behind the internment program. The Report sought to link Japanese Americans with espionage activity, and to associate them with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Columnist Henry McLemore reflected growing public sentiment fueled by this report: 'I am for the immediate removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior. I don't mean a nice part of the interior either.

Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in the badlands. Personally, I hate the Japanese. And that goes for all of them.' Other California newspapers also embraced this view.

According to a Los Angeles Times editorial, 'A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched. So, a Japanese American born of Japanese parents, nurtured upon Japanese traditions, living in a transplanted Japanese atmosphere. Notwithstanding his nominal brand of accidental citizenship almost inevitably and with the rarest exceptions grows up to be a Japanese, and not an American. Thus, while it might cause injustice to a few to treat them all as potential enemies, I cannot escape the conclusion. That such treatment. Should be accorded to each and all of them while we are at war with their race.'

State politicians joined the bandwagon that was embraced by Leland Ford of Los Angeles, who demanded that 'all Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland concentration camps.' Internment of Japanese Americans, who provided critical agricultural labor on the West Coast, created a labor shortage, which was exacerbated by the induction of many American laborers into the Armed Forces. This vacuum precipitated a mass immigration of Mexican workers into the United States to fill these jobs, minorly under the banner of what became known as the. Many Japanese internees were even temporarily released from their camps – for instance, to harvest Western beet crops – to address this wartime labor shortage. Statement of military necessity as justification for internment.